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THE YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION, OR "HOW TO
VEX YOUR LANDLORD WITHOUT REALLY
TRYING"
INTRODUCTION
Often the Butterfly Effect of Chaos Theory' applies to law
as well as physics. Who would have thought that a woman wait-
ing for a train to Far Rockaway would transform tort law? 2 Or
that the boastful advertisement of one of the many quacksalvers
in Merry Olde England would provide a new approach to the law
of contracts?' Likewise, who would have believed that a Queens
strip mall lacking a fire sprinkler system would transform land-
lord-tenant law in New York State when the New York Court of
Appeals handed down its decision in First National Stores, Inc.
v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc.4 Since that day, courts in
New York have interpreted Yellowstone as standing for the pro-
position that a tenant, served with a default notice" by a land-
lord, may seek an injunction to stay the running of the curing
period with little or no proof."
' The Butterfly Effect is a common example used to demonstrate how a nonlinear
system, such as weather, turbulence in fluids, fractal geometry, atomic and sub-atomic
physics and even the dynamics of a ball bouncing on a table, is sensitive to initial condi-
tions. It is "the notion that a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform
storm systems next month in New York." J~As GLEIcK, CHAOS. MA3m~G A NEV, SCWzm;CE
8 (1987). Similarly, law, which can be as unpredictable as the weather, has nonlinear
elements in its social equation.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
3 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256.
4 21 N.Y.2d 630, 237 N.E.2d 868, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1968).
5 A standard provision in commercial and residential leases is that if the tenant
defaults in fulfilling any of the terms of the lease, the landlord shall give the tenant a
written notice to cure (that is, to fix) the default (a "notice to cure"). If the tenant does
not cure within the specified time, then the landlord may cancel the lease by giving the
tenant a written notice of default ("default notice") which usually provides an additional
period of time to cure. See A 261 Lease Agreement, Paragraph 15, Julius Blumberg, Inc.
(1978); Standard Form of Stare Lease, Paragraph 17, The Real Estate Board of New
York, Inc. (1975).
' Continental Towers Garage Corp. v. Contowers Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 141
A.D.2d 390, 529 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1st Dep't 1988); Jemaltvn of 125th St., Inc. v. Leon
Betesh/Park Seen Realty Assocs., 115 A.D.2d 381, 496 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1985);
Herzfeld & Stem v. Ironwood Realty Corp., 102 A.D.2d 737, 477 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep't
1984); Finley v. Park Ten Assocs., 83 A.D.2d 537, 441 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1st Dep't 1981);
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The Yellowstone injunction decisions are ripe with drama.
They contain undertones of the great white tenant doing battle
with the peg-legged landlord that any fan of Melville could ap-
preciate. Thrown in on top of that is a judiciary that often
seems, at best, hopelessly confused.' Taken as a whole, the Yel-
lowstone injunction cases would be mildly amusing,8 but for the
Podolsky v. Hoffman, 82 A.D.2d 763, 441 N.Y.S.2d 238 (lst Dep't 1981); Fratto v. Red
Barn Farmers Mkt. Corp., 144 A.D.2d 635, 535 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't 1988).
7 See Fifty States Mgmt. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 N.Y.2d 573, 389 N.E.2d 113, 415
N.Y.S.2d 800 (1979) (reversed or denied granting of Yellowstone injunctions because
tenant failed to take action within the default period); see also Health 'n Sports, Inc. v.
Providence Capitol Realty Group, Inc., 75 A.D. 2d 884, 428 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't
1980); Wuertz v. Cowne, 65 A.D. 2d 528, 409 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1978); W.F.M.
Restaurant, Inc. v. Austern, 75 Misc.2d 350, 347 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1973); 30-88 Steinway St., Inc. v. H.C. Bohack Co., 65 Misc. 2d 1076, 319 N.Y.S.2d 679
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
But cf. Fratto v. Red Barn Farmers Mkt. Corp. 144 A.D. 2d 635, 535 N.Y.S.2d 53
(2d Dep't 1988) (court reversed denial of Yellowstone injunction nunc pro tunc to date
of application because supreme court "should have" granted it). See, e.g., Continental
Towers Garage Corp. v. Contowers Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 141 A.D.2d 390, 529
N.Y.S.2d 322 (1st Dep' 1988); 144 E. 40th St. Leasing Corp. v. Schneider, 125 A.D.2d
195, 508 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep't 1986); Jbmaltown of 125th St., Inc. v. Leon Betesh/Park
Seen Realty Assocs., 115 A.D.2d 381, 496 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1985); East Side Car
Wash v. K.R.K. Capitol, Inc., 102 A.D.2d 157, 476 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dep't 1984).
Numerous courts misstate the policy behind Yellowstone injunctions. See, e.g.,
Suarez v. El Daro Realty, Inc., 156 A.D.2d 356, 548 N.Y.S.2d 313 (2d Dep't 1989); Heavy
Cream, Inc. v. Kurtz, 146 A.D.2d 672, 537 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2d Dep't 1989); Philex Enters.,
Inc. v. Lanzner, 131 A.D.2d 452, 515 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1987); Podolsky v. Hoffman,
82 A.D.2d 763, 441 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1st Dep't 1981); Madison Ave. Specialties, Inc. v. Se-
ville Enters., Inc., 40 A.D.2d 784, 337 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep't 1972); Westside Towers,
Inc. v. Hevro Realty Corp., 40 A.D.2d 664, 337 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1st Dep't 1972).
Still other courts misapply the Yellowstone test. See, e.g., Post v. 120 E. End Ave.
Corp., 62 N.Y.2d 19, 464 N.E.2d 125, 475 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1984); Somekh v. Ipswich House,
Inc., 81 A.D.2d 662, 438 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 1981).
1 See Novak v. Fischbein, Olivieri, Rozenhole & Badillo, 151 A.D.2d 296, 542
N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1989) (court finds that failure of former attorneys to obtain a
Yellowstone injunction did not constitute legal malpractice because the legislature's
passing of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RPAPL") section 753(4) during
the landlord-tenant proceedings gave the plaintiff another avenue for relief); Podolsky v.
Hoffman, 81 A.D.2d 763, 441 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1st Dep't 1981) (genuine issue of material
fact whether "noxious odors" were in fact coming from tenant's apartment); Philex
Enter., Inc. v. Lanzer, 131 A.D.2d 452, 515 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1987) (court deter-
mined that tenant's selling of items which depict or replicate male genitalia is not "ob-
scene" or "pornographic" as defined under the lease; one wonders whether the landlord,
who was obviously concerned that items of this nature not be sold from a store on his
property, realized that the word philex-the name of the corporation-apparently has
its root in the Greek word OtXv (philein), to love, whence derives the words philander
("to make love insincerely"), necrophilia ("an erotic attraction to corpses") and philog-
yny ("fondness for women"). WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY at
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fact that they carve out a needless exception to the traditional
standard of proof necessary for injunctive relief.0
This Comment examines the development of the Yellow-
stone injunction doctrine, looking at how New York courts have
eroded the traditional burden of proof necessary to obtain in-
junctive relief in a Yellowstone situation. This Comment also
discusses the status of the Yellowstone injunction today, noting
those areas where courts no longer grant, or no longer should
grant, a stay on the running of the curing period on a default or
violation notice. Finally, this Comment proposes that either the
courts revise the Yellowstone test, or that the New York legisla-
ture pass legislation to solve the problems inherent in Yellow-
stone situations.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 9, 1966 the landlord for Yellowstone Shop-
ping Center in Forest Hills, New York, received an order from
the New York City Fire Department to install an automatic
sprinkler system in the cellar of one of its leased stores. 0 The
landlord wrote three letters to First National Stores, Inc., the
tenant of the store, demanding that it comply with the Fire De-
partment's order." Apparently not having received a satisfac-
tory response, the landlord, pursuant to the lease, sent the ten-
1346 (9th ed. 1979); Somekh v. Ipswich House, Inc., 81 A.D.2d 662, 438 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d
Dep't 1981) (court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether keeping a dog in
an apartment was a violation of lease's "no pets" provision); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81
Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1975) (Yellowstone does not
apply because residential lease found to be one of adhesion due to the general housing
shortage in Rockland County).
' The standard test for injunctive relief is: (1) the likelihood of ultimate success on
the merits; (2) whether irreparable injury will occur absent injunctive relief (no adequate
remedy in law); and (3) a balancing of equities in favor of petitioner. Finley v. Park Ten
Assocs., 83 A.D.2d 537, 441 N.Y.S.2d 475 (lst Dep't 1981); Albini v. Solork, 37 A.D.2d
835, 326 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1971); Schuller v. D'Angelo, 117 Misc. 2d 528, 458
N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983). See generally 67 N.Y. Jun. 2n Injunctions.
But see Douglas Laycock, The Death Of The Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARv. L R.
688 (1990).
10 First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 634, 237
N.E.2d 868, 869, 260 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722 (1968).
" The landlord based its demand on a lease provision that read: "Lessee agrees to
observe and comply with all requirements of governmental authority relating to matters
affecting the leased premises only and involving the use of the leased premises over
which lessee would exercise control during the normal course of its business operation
.... " Yellowstone, 21 N.Y.2d at 635-36, 237 N.E.2d at 869-70, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24.
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ant written notice that if it did not cure the violations within ten
days, the lease would terminate.12 On the tenth and final day of
the cure period, the tenant brought an action for a declaratory
judgment that it was not in violation of the lease.13 On the issue
of who was responsible for installing the sprinkler system, 14 the
New York Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the appellate di-
vision's decision in the landlord's favor.
15
However, the appellate division in its 5-to-2 majority opin-
ion also decided that although the court could declare that the
lease had terminated due to the tenant's default, it would not
because the "tenant was acting in good faith when it brought the
declaratory judgment action. 16 Instead, the majority gave the
tenant twenty days to install a sprinkler system that conformed
with the Fire Department's order, or to pay if the landlord had
already installed such a system, and permanently enjoined any
eviction proceedings on the issues decided. 17 The court based
this part of its decision on Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg,8
which held that "[o]nce a court of equity has jurisdiction of a
case, it has the power to dispose of all the matters at issue and
grant complete relief."' * The court of appeals, also in a 5-to-2
12 Article 12 of the lease provided: "In case lessee shall default in the performance of
any covenant or agreement herein contained, and such default shall continue for ten (10)
days after receipt by the lessee of written notice thereof given by lessor, then lessor, at
the option of lessor, may declare said term ended, and may re-enter upon the leased
premises either with or without process of law, and remove all persons therefrom." Yel-
lowstone, 21 N.Y.2d at 634-35, 237 N.E.2d at 869, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23.
" The tenant based its action on the lease provision entitled LESSOR'S RPAMS
which provided that lessor was "to make all repairs to or alterations of the leased prem-
ises which may be required by governmental authority." Yellowstone, 21 N.Y.2d at 635,
237 N.E.2d at 869, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
"4 The tenant brought its action in Supreme Court, Queens County. The supreme
court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that tenant's cause of action is more ap-
propriate as a defense to a summary proceeding by the landlord. On appeal, the parties,
by stipulation, authorized the appellate division to decide the controversy as a matter of
law. Id.
15 The court of appeals affirmed that part of the appellate division's decision hold-
ing that under the lease, First National was "responsible for repairs, alterations, or addi-
tions to the premises required by governmental authority as a result of its specific use of
the premises" and that "the necessity for the sprinkler system arose primarily because of
the manner in which the tenant used its premises." Yellowstone, 21 N.Y.2d at 636, 237
N.E.2d at 870, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25 (emphasis in original).
1 Yellowstone, 28 A.D.2d 873, 874, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 875 (2d Dep't 1967).
17 Id.
272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936).
19 Yellowstone, 28 A.D2d at 873, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (quoting Ferguson 272 N.Y. at
[Vol. 58:15
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decision, reversed the appellate division's grant of injunctive re-
lief.20 The court of appeals relied on its even earlier decision in
Graf v. Hope Building Corp.21 The Graf court decided, over the
vigorous dissent of Chief Judge Cardozo, that the "[s]tability of
contract obligations must not be undermined by judicial sympa-
thy."22 Similarly, in Yellowstone the court announced that
in a proper case, a court has the fullest liberty in molding its decree to
the necessities of the occasion. But, it cannot grant equitable relief if
there is no acceptable basis for doing so. Here, the lease has been ter-
minated in strict accordance with its terms. The tenant did not ob-
tain a temporary restraining order until after the landlord acted
.... The sympathetic attitude of the majority below is understanda-
ble, but must be rejected.23
The Yellowstone court, in following the Graf majority, declined
to follow Cardozo's position that "[e]quity follows the law, but
not slavishly nor always. If it did, there could never be occasion
for the enforcement of the equitable doctrine.
2 4
Graf involved a mortgage acceleration clause. Cardozo, in
his dissent, concentrated on the fact that the defendant was late
on only a small portion of one payment out of a series of forty
because of a clerk's mathematical error.2 5 The renowned jurist
presaged the appellate division's "good faith" argument in Yel-
lowstone when he emphasized that a court, in its role as a court
of chancery,26 can take into account "the measure of the hard-
ship, [and] the extent of the oppression"2 of the default upon
the lender, versus whether the default was "due to mere venial
inattention and if relief can be granted without damage to the
lender.1
28
In the end, the seven judges in the appellate division and
239, 5 N.E.2d at 802).
20 Yellowstone, 21 N.Y.2d at 638, 237 N.E.2d at 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
21 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
2 Id. at 4, 171 N.E. at 885.
23 Yellowstone, 21 N.Y.2d at 637, 237 N.E.2d at 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (emphasis
added).
24 Graf, 254 N.Y. at 9, 171 N.E. at 887 (Cardozo, C.J. dissenting) (citing Hedges v.
Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) and 13 HALSBURY. LAWS OF ENGLAND 68).
25 Graf, 254 N.Y. at 7-8, 171 N.E. at 886.
" In American jurisprudence, the terms "court of chancery" and "court of equity"
are interchangeable. See BLAcK's LAw Dic'oNARY 428-29 (4th ed. 1951).




court of appeals who believed that the court's equitable power
allowed them to declare that First National's lease was not ter-
minated, lost to their seven brothers, who could not imagine
tampering with a contract's provisions. However, while protect-
ing the "[s]tability of contract obligations,"29 the court of ap-
peals' opinion, by virtue of its harsh result, laid the groundwork
for what has become today's Yellowstone injunctive relief. Al-
though the Yellowstone decision was pro-landlord, it signaled to
tenant lawyers with clients who had been served with a notice to
cure or notice of default that they could seek a preliminary in-
junction to stay the running of the cure period. In response to
the harsh effects of not granting a stay, as evinced in Yellow-
stone, the lower courts began to issue these Yellowstone injunc-
tions routinely, preventing landlords from terminating leases.30
II. THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT
A. The Butterfly Flaps its Wings
The first two years after Yellowstone produced no decisions
of any real interest or controversy.3 1 But in 1972, 57 E. 54 Realty
Corp.,3 2 a decision from the New York County Appellate Term,33
29 Yellowstone, 21 N.Y.2d at 638, 237 N.E.2d at 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
30 Paul A. Batista, 'Yellowstone', Revisited: The Pendulum Has Swung, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 29, 1983, at 1.
31 Wienerwald 8th St., Inc. v. Third Brevoort Corp., 38 A.D.2d 525, 326 N.Y.S.2d
860 (1st Dep't 1971) (tenant took immediate action and needed an extra 30 days to com-
plete the work); 150 E. 58th St. Assocs. v. Fletcher, 35 A.D.2d 947, 316 N.Y.S.2d 644 (lst
Dep't 1970) (stay on notice to cure granted because there was a justiciable issue as to
whether the notice to cure was valid); Swan Prods. Co. v. 130-30 Bldg. Corp., 35 A.D.2d
789, 315 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1st Dep't 1970) (tenant did not move for injunctive relief within
the cure period).
32 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d
872 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
33 In New York, the court of appeals is the state's court of last resort. Below it are
the main intermediate appellate courts that have four departments. The First Depart-
ment includes Bronx and New York counties. The Second Department comprises Dutch-
ess, Kings, Nassau, Orange, Putnam, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk and West-
chester counties. The Third Department contains Albany, Broome, Chemung, Chenango,
Clinton, Columbia, Cortland, Delaware, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Hamilton,
Madison, Montgomery, Otsego, Rensselaer, St. Lawrence, Saratoga, Schenectady, Scho-
harie, Schuyler, Tioga, Tompkins, Sullivan, Ulster, Warren and Washington counties.
The Fourth Department includes Allegeny, Cayuga, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee,
Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Livingston, Monroe, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario,
Orleans, Oswego, Seneca, Steuben, Wayne, Wyoming and Yates counties.
Below the appellate divisions is the main court of original jurisdiction-the supreme
[Vol. 58: 155
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marked a shift in this genre of landlord-tenant cases. The 57 E.
54 Realty Corp. court refused to terminate a tenant's lease, even
though the tenant was late two months in a row in paying rentm
on the principle that "the law abhors the forfeiture of leases," 311
especially when the forfeiture results from nonpayment of rent.
While the court held that Yellowstone "does not mandate the
contrary," the decision was insincere in its homage, flying di-
rectly in the face of Yellowstone."' Ruling that the time had
come for the law of leases to catch up with the law of contracts,
the lower court decided, without citing any precedent, that "[t]o
strictly enforce provisions of leases in such circumstances is to
run counter to all modern thinking. ' 37 The court stated:
Touching bottom, what did [the] landlord actually lose by the delay
in the payment of tenant's rent? A given amount of interest. It could
have compelled payment of the rent and of the interest by non-pay-
ment proceedings. It chose not to. Instead, it chose surreptitiously to
reacquire the space.38
In arguing contrary to both Yellowstone and Graf (although
in line with Cardozo's dissent in Graf), the appellate term was
the tail wagging the dog. By basing its decision on attitudinal
court's role is larger and higher than that of the other trial courts in recognition of the
fact that the supreme court has general jurisdiction, while all the other trial courts have
limited subject matter jurisdiction. Almost level with the supreme court are the court of
claims and surrogate's, county and family courts, that have a process territorial scope
equal to that of the supreme court. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1(c).
Below these courts are the New York City Civil Court, New York City Criminal
Court, the district courts, town courts and village courts that are limited in both subject
matter and territorial jurisdiction. The judges in the city and district courts must be
lawyers, while judges of town and village courts do not have to be laryers. N.Y. Co~sr.
art. VI, § 20(a).
The appellate division of each department has the authority to create an appellate
-term out of the supreme courts. If created, these appellate terms hear appeals from the
New York City Civil Court, New York City Criminal Court, the district courts, town
courts and village courts. There are currently appellate terms in the First and Second
Departments. See DAviD D. SmGEL, HANDBOOK OF NEw YoRK PRAcncE § 9 (1978).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Lupiano pointed out that the tenant had actu-
ally paid its rent late almost every month for almost 51.1 years. 57 E. 54 Realty Corp., 71
Misc. 2d at 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
57 E. 54 Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d at 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (1st Dep't
1969)(citing 220 W. 42 Assoc. v. Cohen, 60 Misc. 2d 983, 985, 302 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496
(1969)).
36 Id. at 354, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 873.




jurisprudence instead of the concurring opinion's course of con-
duct argument,"' the lower court opened the door to an era of
extreme pro-tenant doctrine.40 This decision also illustrates why
courts began handing out Yellowstone injunctions to tenants as
freely as candy is given to children on Halloween.41 The 57 E. 54
Realty Corp. court fashioned a heavy presumption that the ten-
ant has a right to keep its lease, which the landlord's contractual
rights cannot upend. In effect, the court determines, before the
substantive issues have been joined, that absent the injunctive
relief, there is an irreparable injury to the tenant. Therefore, the
equities scale presumably tips in favor of the tenant.
B. The Air Stirs
The court's determination in 57 E. 54 Realty Corp., al-
though significant, was limited in impact by the fact that it
came out of an appellate term. But five months later the First
Department's appellate division echoed the appellate term's sen-
timents in Madison Avenue Specialties, Inc. v. Seville Enter-
prises, Inc.42 The Madison Avenue court decided that the ques-
tion of whether there was a breach in the lease was unimportant.
The only issue considered was whether "there may be equitable
considerations which would forbid forfeiture as the remedy.
'43
The court went on to say that "[w]here such elements are pre-
sent the injunction is appropriate. Otherwise the lease will be
terminated. Where the supreme court could fashion the proper
remedy but the civil court lacks jurisdiction to do so, injunction
" See supra note 35.
40 See Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 805-6
(1974) (under the subsection entitled "Doctrines Openly Hostile to the Landlord and the
Lease"); Batista, supra note 30, at 1; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.1 cmt.
a (1976) (because promises by the tenant induced the landlord to enter the lease, failure
on the part of the tenant to perform within a reasonable time after being requested to do
so is a valid reason for the landlord to terminate). But see Stacey L. Wallach, 'Yellow-
stone' Revisited I1-A Different View of Doctrine, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 21, 1984, at 1 (Yellow-
stone injunction is helpful because it brings both parties in front of a judge faster than if
the landlord had brought a summary proceeding in Civil Court, and is justified in that
controversies can be decided on the merits without forfeiture hanging over the tenant's
head.).
41 Special Term, Part I of Supreme Court, New York County, noted that Yellow-
stone injunctions "have been granted as a matter of routine." Wilen v. Harridge House
Assocs., 116 Misc. 2d 724, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1007 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
42 40 A.D.2d 784, 337 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep't 1972).
-3 Id. at 785, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (citing Yellowstone).
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should issue." 44 But the First Department failed to identify
these "equitable considerations." Further, by refusing to look at
the merits of the case, the court destroyed the traditional test of
whether the party seeking injunctive relief has a likelihood of
winning.
C. The Legislature is Momentarily Awakened
In 1982 the New York State legislature amended Real Prop-
erty Actions and Proceeding Law ("RPAPL") section 753 by ad-
ding a new subdivision 4, which stated that "in the event that
such [a summary] proceeding is based upon a claim that the ten-
ant or lessee has breached a provision of the lease, the court
shall grant a ten day stay of issuance of the warrant, during
which time the respondent may correct such breach."4  What led
the legislature to amend the law is uncertain.4 a The new section
applies only to violations of New York City residential leases
that do not involve nonpayment 47-the subject of the majority
44 Id.
45 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 753 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1992) ("RPAPL") (empha-
sis added).
6 There is little legislative history on the amendment to section 753. See 1982 N.Y.
Laws, c. 870, § 1; N.Y. LEGIS. REc. AND INDEX 1982. Senate Bills 9212, introduced April
12, 1982, passed June 30, 1982. Assembly Bill A13035, introduced June 14, 1982, passed
July 2, 1982. See also Post v. 120 E. End Ave. Corp., 96 A.D.2d 697, 464 N.Y.S.2d 108,
109 (1st Dep't 1983) (noting limited legislative history to this amendment).
Why the legislature chose ten days as the amount of time is also not obvious from
the legislative history. The section that applies to nonpayment proceedings outside New
York City provides for a discretionary stay of four months. RPAPL § 751(4)(a).
The section that applies to non-payment proceedings within New York City pro-
vides for a discretionary stay of six months. RPAPL § 753(1). The legislature might have
given a short stay period since the stay is mandatory. Connecticut, which has a similar
provision, provides for a 20 day stay of execution in non-payment proceedings involving
residential dwellings and trailer parks. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-36 (1978). Leases pub-
lished by The Real Estate Board of New York, Inc. and Julius Blumberg, Inc. have stan-
dard notice to cure periods of 15 and 5 days respectively. Perhaps the legislature decided
that the average of these two common lease provisions was sufficient time to cure a resi-
dential lease violation.
4" See Top-All Varieties, Inc. v. RAJ Dev. Co., 151 A.D.2d 470,542 N.YS.2d 259 (2d
Dep't 1989); Sal De Enter., Inc. v. Stobar Realty, Inc., 143 A.D.2d 180, 531 N.Y.S.2d 628
(2d Dep't 1988); Parksouth Dental Group, P.C. v. East River Realty, 122 A.D.2d 708, 505
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1986). Nonpayment proceedings are controlled by RPAPL § 749,
§ 751(1-3) and § 755. Because these sections provide for a discretionary stay of eviction
proceedings, Yellowstone injunctions are unnecessary. For example, RPAPL section 755
provides that the court may stay summary proceedings to dispossess a tenant for non-
payment of rent when the tenant can show she stopped paying rent because the condi-
tions of the premises are dangerous to her life, safety or health.
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of the Yellowstone injunction cases at the time.48 Effective on
July 29, 1982, it was only three months before a court referred to
this new section in a published opinion.
In Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc. v. Mauro4e the Housing
Court in Queens County (which is within the Second Depart-
ment) gave the tenant, in a summary hold over proceeding, 0 the
new mandatory ten day stay of issuance- of the warrant for evic-
tion, even though the tenant had failed to appear at trial. The
court noted that under the mandatory language of the statute,
the respondent's failure to appear was not an issue. Since a resi-
dential lease was involved and the action was not for nonpay-
ment, RPAPL section 753(4) applied, and therefore the court
must give the tenant an additional ten days to cure its violation.
It further noted that although the stay authorized by the new
amendment was not technically the same as a Yellowstone in-
junction, it was substantially the same in that it "constitutes a
conditional limitation on the landlord's right of termination of
the leasehold by reason of a breach of a provision of the lease." 1
Apparently the rest of the courts in the Second Department
agreed because there has not been another reported case since
Glen Oaks, where a Second Department court granted a Yellow-
stone injunction in a residential lease dispute.
At first it seemed that the First Department also adopted
the reasoning in Glen Oaks. In four decisions of rapid succes-
sion, the First Department ostensibly agreed with the Second
Department. In Wilen v. Harridge House Associates"2 the court
said that even though it "had not had the opportunity to study
the legislative history, [the amendment] would appear to have as
a primary purpose the elimination in most cases of the Yellow-
stone injunction and the heavy traffic between the Civil Court
and the Supreme Court which it spawns." 53 In Schuller v.
D'Angelo 4 the court recognized that although "the application
for a Yellowstone injunction is not ordinarily subject to the
', See Batista, supra note 30, at 3.
'" 117 Misc. 2d 151, 457 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
'0 A hold over proceeding is a proceeding to remove a tenant who is occupying the
premises after his lease has expired.
1 Glen Oaks Village Owners, 117 Misc. 2d at 152, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
52 116 Misc. 2d 724, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
" Wilen, 116 Misc. 2d 724, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 1007; see supra note 33.
117 Misc. 2d 528, 458 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
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same strictures as other injunctions ... [n]evertheless, a re-
quest for a Yellowstone injunction is still a prayer for equitable
relief, which requires that plaintiff make a sufficient showing
that she has no adequate remedy at law. It is clear that the new
statute affords such a remedy."' ' s The appellate division then de-
nied Yellowstone injunctions in Mannis v. Jillandrea Realty
Co. 56 and Klausner v. Frank,57 also on the grounds that RPAPL
section 753(4) made the injunctive relief unnecessary.
Apparently unhappy with the easy, clear and concise deci-
sions in Wilen, Schuller, Mannis and Klausner, the First De-
partment flip-flopped and unanimously reversed the lower
court's decision in Wilen. 6 It then implicitly overruled Schuller,
Mannis and Klausner in Post v. 120 East End Ave. Corp.9 The
First Department now decided that the new amendment did not
apply because "[n]othing in the legislation's sponsor's memoran-
dum indicates such a purpose" 0 and "it makes no endeavor to
treat ... the legal theory underlying [the effect of Yellow-
stone]." 61
Quite correctly, the court of appeals reversed the First De-
partment in Post.2 The court recognized that although the stat-
ute did not expressly authorize the revival of a lease which
under the court of appeals' Yellowstone decision would termi-
nate, it implicitly authorized such a revival. The court based its
understanding on the limited legislative history of RPAPL sec-
tion 753(4), pointing to the Memorandum of Senator Leon
Bogues which stated that the amendment was made in response
to tenants' "reasonable expectation that they will have an op-
portunity to cure once they have been advised by the court that,
" Id. at 532-33, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
94 A.D.2d 676, 463 N.Y.S.2d 3 (2d Dep't 1983).
57 95 A.D.2d 653, 463 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2d Dep't 1983).
' Wilen v. Harridge House Assocs., 49 A.D.2d 123, 463 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1st Dep't
1983).
" 95 A.D.2d 697, 464 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1st Dep't 1983). Plaintiff, a psychiatrist, used
his apartment to see patients, violating his lease which specified that the apartment was
for private dwelling use only. Plaintiff submitted his order to show cause before RPAPL
section 753(4) had come into effect. The supreme court granted the Yellowstone injunc-
tion, signing the order subsequent to the new RPAPL statute's effective date. On appeal
by landlord, the First Department affirmed the order.
60 Wilen v. Harridge House Assoc., 94 A.D.2d at 126, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
, Post, 95 A.D.2d at 697, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
62 62 N.Y.2d 19, 464 N.E.2d 125, 475 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1984).
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in fact, they have breached the lease provision. 63 Also indica-
tive of the New York State legislature's intent was the Gover-
nor's bill jacket which indicated that there had been opposition
to the bill precisely because it would allow revival of a lease.
6 4
The court also stated that if RPAPL section 753(4) allowed the
tenant to cure once it was determined that a lease provision was
breached, but did not allow revival of the lease, then the amend-
ment would be mere "surplusage."6 1
The Post court also noted that aside from statutory
interpretation
there are sound policy reasons for interpreting the statute in this way.
Civil Court has jurisdiction of landlord tenant disputes... and when
it can decide the dispute, as in this case, it is desirable to do so ....
Yellowstone injunctions have impaired the effectiveness of summary
proceedings, however, by enabling tenants to go into Supreme Court
where delay may be encountered- because of crowded calendars and
pretrial proceedings available in plenary actions. Moreover, if the
landlord prevails in Supreme Court, he must still go into Civil Court
to evict the tenant. Under the amended statute the tenant's claim
may properly be alleged as defenses to the summary proceedings and
complete relief may be obtained in Civil Court .... To this extent
the statute limits our holding in First National Stores v. Yellowstone
Shopping Center.86
D. The Weather in New York is Affected
With the court's decision in Post, the Yellowstone doctrine
was limited, and still is limited, to commercial disputes involving
lease violations.17 However, the same problems that necessitated
the passage of RPAPL section 753(4) still plague commercial
lease disputes.
03 Id. at 27, 464 N.E.2d at 128, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (citing N.Y. LEGIs. ANN., 1982, at
280). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Post, 62 N.Y.2d at 27, 464 N.E.2d at 128, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
0Id.
6 Post, 62 N.Y.2d at 27-28, 464 N.E.2d at 129, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
07 Cf. Weinberg v. Norson Realty Corp., 132 Misc. 2d 1055, 506 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1986). Since RPAPL section 753(4) applies to a residential lease, the
relaxed Yellowstone injunction standard does not apply when a tenant applies for a stay
on the statutory ten day cure period. Because the tenant did not demonstrate, but
merely alleged, that ten days was an insufficient amount of time to cure, the court denied
an additional stay; the tenant did not meet its burden to obtain injunctive relief. But see
Seligmann v. Parcel One Co., 170 A.D.2d 344, 566 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1st Dep't 1991); Ernestus
v. 10 W. 66th St. Corp., N.Y. L.J., August 26, 1992, at 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1992).
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The First Department built upon its Madison Avenue deci-
sion in Podolsky v. Hoffman. 8 There, the court identified the
tenants' "substantial property interest in their lease" as the eq-
uitable consideration that makes a Yellowstone injunction
mandatory in most commercial cases. Also, the court announced
that the reason it must continue handing out this injunctive re-
lief is so that "if [tenants] prevail on the merits their success
will not be nullified by the lease having terminated." 0 The First
.Department's announcement revealed a pronounced misunder-
standing about the issues involved in granting a Yellowstone in-
junction. It is an undisputed fact that if a tenant wins (whether
in civil court or in supreme court) on the merits, then the de-
fault notice was defective and therefore of no consequence.7 0
Later, the court of appeals in Post clearly rearticulated the pol-
icy behind Yellowstone injunctions: that the only danger to the
tenant is when he loses on the merits, i.e. the landlord had a
legitimate basis for serving the notice to cure, and the lease is
void.
After Post courts continued to declare that even if the ten-
ant was wrong, the law so abhors forfeiture of a lease that courts
must do what they can to protect the tenant's property rights.71
To accomplish this goal, courts continued to chip away at what
was left of the traditional standard of proof necessary for equita-
ble relief.
In seeking to soften the requirements for a Yellowstone in-
junction, courts often looked to Finley v. Park Ten Associates,
7 2
a pre-Post case in which the First Department declared that
"the standards normally applicable to temporary injunctive re-
lief have little application to a Yellowstone situation."" The
Finley court abolished "the three usual requirements" that an
applicant show: "1) that he will ultimately likely prevail on the
merits; 2) that he would suffer irreparable hardship if the in-
junction were not granted; and 3) that the equities weigh in his
- 82 A.D.2d 763, 441 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1st Dep't 1981).
69 Id. at 239.
70 Post, 62 N.Y.2d at 25, 464 N.E.2d at 127, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
71 See Langham Mansions Co. v. Bodine, 117 Misc. 2d 925, 461 N.YS.2d 147 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
7-2 83 A.D.2d 537, 441 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1st Dep't 1981).
73 Id. (emphasis added).
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favor."*7 Elaborating on its own opinions in Podolsky and Fin-
ley, rather than on court of appeals precedent, the First Depart-
ment decided that Yellowstone injunctions deserve their own
special test: (1) that a notice to cure threatening termination of
the lease be served on the petitioner; (2) that there is a cure
other than eviction available;7 5 and presumably (3) that the mo-
tion to the court be made before the lease becomes void under
the notice to cure. The standard for the second prong of this
new test is basically that the tenant comes to court and claims in
boilerplate language that there is a practical method to cure the
illegality without resort to eviction. The First Department con-
tinues to stand by its three-prong Yellowstone-Finley test.76 The
Second Department also formally adopted this test in Fratto v.
Red Barn Farmers Mkt. Corp.77 It is ironic that Yellowstone,
which dictated judicial control over sympathy, has now become
the label for a doctrine that twists traditional standards for eq-
uitable relief precisely for sympathetic purposes.
III. "ONE OF THE BRIGHTEST GEMS IN THE NEW ENGLAND
WEATHER IS THE DAZZLING UNCERTAINTY OF IT":75 The Excep-
tions To The Rule?
Even with such a low threshold test, courts acknowledge five
circumstances when they should not, or might not, grant a Yel-
lowstone injunction. Three of the five "should not" circum-
stances are readily apparent and easy to show to a court: (1) that
the court has the ability to revive a voided lease through statute
(as with RPAPL section 753(4) in all residential cases); (2) that
the tenant did not move for an injunction before the lease be-
came void under the notice to cure;79 and (3) that the lease gives
" Demler v. Bing & Bing Mgmt., Inc., 116 Misc. 2d 793, 456 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
75 Id.
7' Continental Towers Garage Corp. v. Contowers Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 141
A.D.2d 390, 529 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1st Dep't 1988); Jemaltown of 125th St., Inc. v. Leon
Betesh/Park Seen Realty Assocs., 115 A.D.2d 381, 496 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1985);
Herzfeld & Stern v. Ironwood Realty Corp., 102 A.D.2d 737, 477 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep't
1984).
77 144 A.D.2d 635, 535 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't 1988).
7'8 Mark Twain, Address on New England Weather, in NEw ENGLAND SOCIETY (Dec.
22, 1876).
79 Fifty States Mgmt. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 N.Y.2d 573, 389 N.E.2d 113, 415
N.Y.S.2d 800 (1979); Yellowstone, 21 N.Y.2d 630, 237 N.E.2d 868, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721
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the tenant no opportunity to cure. 0
Two of the five "might not" circumstances are harder to
demonstrate to a court. The first circumstance is when there is
no practical way for the tenant to cure other than by moving out
of the leased premises. The second circumstance is when the
tenant somehow, even with such a minute threshold in place,
fails to express a desire to cure the violation.
A. When the Tenant has No Practical Way to Cure Without
Vacating the Premises
Childress v. Lepkis1 involved a tenant using commercial
space for residential purposes. The appellate division, First De-
partment, found that, if in fact the lease prohibited such a use,
the only way the tenant could cure this default was to move
out.8 2 The court also correctly pointed out that if indeed there
was no violation of the lease, then there would be nothing to
cure and the lease would remain intact.
The "no practical way to cure" exception was rendered vir-
tually nonexistent within the First Department by Demler v.
Bing & Bing Mgmt., Inc.a3 and Herzfeld & Stern v. Ironwood
Realty Corp.84 In these cases, courts in the First Department
found that even violations of the Certificate of Occupancy ("C.
of 0.") under the New York City Building Code are not enough
to defeat the granting of a Yellowstone injunction, because there
is always the possibility of amending the Building Code Occu-
pancy Use of the C. of 0.1 The First Department is apparently
(1968).
80 Newmann v. Mapama Corp., 96 A.D.2d 793, 466 N.Y.S.2d 331 (lst Dep't 1983)
(tenant must have a lease to apply for a Yellowstone injunction); 233 E. 88th St. Corp. v.
Park E. Apts., Inc., 131 Misc. 2d 242, 499 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1988) (no
right to cure under the lease); Boyarsky v. Froccaro, 125 Misc. 2d 352, 479 N.YS.2d 606
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (no cure provision in the lease); Boyle v. Pon Constr. Corp.,
74 Misc. 2d 307, 344 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. CL N.Y. County 1973) (contract, not a lease
involved).
81 72 A.D.2d 724, 443 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1st Dept 1979).
82 But cf. Taylor v. Eli Haddad Corp., 118 Misc. 2d 253, 460 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983) (in the First Department) (later held that there are other ways to
cure residential use of commercial space and therefore injunctive relief is proper under
the Yellowstone doctrine).
" 116 Misc. 2d 793, 456 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
102 A.D.2d 737, 477 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep't 1984).
Typical commercial leases, such as those published by The New York Real Estate
Board, Inc. and Julius Blumberg, Inc., contain a provision that the tenant shall comply
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willing to bar Yellowstone injunctions only for violations of zon-
ing ordinances,86 even though there are no published cases di-
rectly involving such a circumstance.8 7
In the Second Department, the C. of 0. exception is still
viable because of the appellate division's decision in Times
Square Stores Corp. v. Bernice Realty Co.88 There the court rec-
ognized that it cannot force the landlord to cooperate in the ten-
ant's application to amend the C. of 0. Ergo, the tenant has no
with all requirements of all federal, state, municipal and local governments. Under New
York State Multiple Dwelling Law section 301 ". . . no dwelling constructed as or al-
tered or converted into a multiple dwelling after April eighteenth, nineteen hundred
twenty-nine, shall be occupied in whole or in part until the issuance of a certificate of
compliance or occupancy." N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 301(2) (McKinney 1974). The City
of New York issues a C. of 0. through the Department of Buildings. A C. of 0. contains
the permissible use and occupancy (for each floor and, in the case of apartments, condo-
miniums and co-operatives, for each unit) by rating each floor and/or unit by: (a) Live
Load Pounds Per Square Foot; (b) Maximum Number of Persons Permitted; (c) Zoning
Dwelling of Rooming Units; (d) Building Code Habitable Rooms; (e) Zoning Use Group;
(f) Building Code Occupancy Group; and (g) Description of Use. Although the Building
Department issues the C. of 0., the permissible use and occupancy categories are con-
trolled not only by the New York City Building Code, but also by the New York City
Fire Code and New York City Zoning Resolutions.
The Building Code Occupancy Group is classified by letter codes under New York
Administrative Code sections 27-237 through 27-267 and Table 3-1, as follows: A-High
hazard; B-i-Storage (moderate hazard); B-2-Storage (low hazard); C-Mercantile; D-1-In-
dustrial (moderate hazard); D-2-Industrial (low hazard); E-Business; F-la-Assembly
(theaters, etc.); F-lb-Assembly (churches, concert halls, etc.); F-2-Assembly (outdoors);
F-3-Assembly (museums, etc.); F-4-Assembly (restaurants, etc.); G-Education; H-i-Insti-
tutional (restrained); H-2-Institutional (incapacitated); J-1-Residential (hotels, etc.); J-2-
Residential (apartment houses, etc.); J-3-Residential (one- and two-family dwellings),
and; K-Miscellaneous. Pursuant to New York Administrative Code section 27-220, appli-
cations for a change in the certificate of occupancy (for any category except zoning use
group) must be made by, or on behalf of, the owner of the building premises.
" Zoning Use Groups are classified by number codes under the New York City Zon-
ing Resolutions. Use Groups 1 and 2 are residential, Use Groups 3 and 4 are community
facilities, Use Groups 5 through 11 are commercial, Use Groups 12 through 15 are recrea-
tional, and Use Group 16 is for general services. The Zoning Resolutions assign Use
Groups to the different parts of the five New York City counties by complex geographi-
cal boundaries, each boundary permitting one or more Use Groups. Only legislation
passed by the New York City Council can change the Zoning Resolutions, although the
New York City local community boards may grant variances on a case-by-case basis.
" There is one lower court opinion that discussed, in dicta, the tenant not having
the ability to cure because the violation involved zoning problems. However, the court
denied a Yellowstone injunction on the ground that the lease did not have a cure provi-
sion. Boyarsky v. Froccaro, 125 Misc. 2d 352, 479 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1984).
88 107 A.D.2d 677, 484 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dep't 1985).
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way to cure other than to vacate the premises.89
B. When the Tenant Shows No Desire to Cure
Recent decisions recognize that there are times when the
tenant's behavior warrants denial of a Yellowstone injunction.
In Cemco Restaurants, Inc. v. Ten Park Ave. Tenants Corp.0
the First Department upheld the supreme court's denial of a
Yellowstone injunction. Cemco started out as a typical Yellow-
stone situation. The landlord served a notice to cure because the
tenant had opened a transvestite musical revue in violation of a
lease provision that the premises be conducted and operated in a
"dignified manner." 1 The tenant, in moving for a Yellowstone
injunction, denied that there was a lease violation.2 Of course,
in almost every Yellowstone situation the tenant denies that
there is a violation, but here the tenant forgot to state in its
papers that if there was a violation, it was willing cure it. The
Cemco court found that while the tenant had met the Yellow-
stone threshold the injunction will be denied 3 if: (1) the tenant
fails to "show" that it is willing to cure, short of vacating the
premises, and (2) the landlord's "other evidence is sufficient to
show that it is likely to prevail on the merits, that [tenant's]
conduct will cause irreparable harm, and that the equities favor
[the landlord]." '94
so One unpublished lower court decision in the First Department since Times
Square v. Bernice appears to contradict these potential exceptions. This opinion, how-
ever, failed to reach the merits of the alleged C. of 0. violations advanced by the land-
lord. See Sixty-Six Crosby Assocs. v. Soho Plaza Corp., No. 90-25926, slip op. (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. County June 5, 1991)(consolidated with Sixty-Six Crosby Asocs. v. Soho Plaza
Corp., No. 91-1974). The court refused to examine, without comment, the overwhelming
evidence showing that plaintiffs had no way to cure without vacating the premises. Ig-
noring defendants' numerous affirmations, exhibits and memoranda of law in opposition
that showed severe violations of the C. of 0. Building Code Use Groups and Zoning
Resolution Use Groups, the court granted a Yellowstone injunction because "[p~laintiffs
are presently trying to cure alleged violations." Sixty-Six Crosby Assocs., slip op. at 3.
90 135 A.D.2d 461, 522 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1987).
91 Cemco, 135 A.D.2d at 461-62, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
92 Id. at 463, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
13 Cemco is noteworthy because it hints that a landlord might sucsfully deflect a
Yellowstone situation if it can launch a preemptive strike by requesting a declaratory
judgment that the tenant is violating the lease. Of course, due to the expenses involved,
this strategy is only appealing when the violations are so clear that the landlord would
win on a motion for summary judgment.
Cemco, 135 A.D.2d. at 463-64, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
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Similarly, the Second Department relied on Cemco in
Linmont Realty, Inc. v. Vitocarl, Inc.,9e refusing to overturn the
denial of a Yellowstone injunction. The court reasoned that:
The plaintiff herein has made no offer to cure any of the charged de-
faults, alleging instead that many of the alleged defaults listed in the
"Notice of Termination of Lease" were not its responsibility, that va-
rious conditions did not exist as claimed by the defendants, and that
the remainder of the defaults had been waived by the defendants' ac-
ceptance of rent with knowledge of their existence. In the absence of a
good faith showing of a willingness to cure, the Yellowstone injunction
was properly denied.96
The First Department then followed with American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Rolex Realty Co., Inc.9 7 The court based its deci-
sion on the tenant having moved for the injunction too late. The
court in American Airlines noted that "long after the notice to
cure and notice of termination were served, [the tenant] contin-
ued the conduct complained of in the default notice." 8 Of
course in every Yellowstone situation the tenant continues the
conduct complained of in the default notice. Under the strict
Yellowstone-Finley three-prong test, the courts should not have
considered the tenants' behavior or the landlords' likelihood of
success. One can only hope that these cases presage a move back
towards the traditional standards of proof required for equitable
relief.
IV. "'TuT, TUT, CHILD,' SAID THE DUCHESS. 'EVERYTHING'S GOT A
MORAL IF ONLY YOU CAN FIND IT'."
99
It is clear that courts' sympathetic attitude is warranted
when a tenant will lose its property right for a minor and cor-
rectable violation. But it is unclear why courts refuse to use the
traditional tests for equitable relief. If the tenant just needs a
little more time to correct the violation, or if a true dispute
arises over an ambiguity in the lease (as in the original Yellow-
stone case), an injunction would issue under the traditional eq-
uity tests. Courts argue that tenants need more protection than
" 147 A.D.2d 618, 538 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d Dep't 1989).
Id. at 618, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
165 A.D.2d 701, 560 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1990).
Id. at 703, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
'8 Lewis Carroll, ALIcE's ADVENTURE IN WONDERLAND ch. 9 (1865).
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landlords. But this image of the landlord always wronging the
tenant, or always being in a position of superiority, is not
demonstrated by the cases. If one looks at the majority of Yel-
lowstone cases, it becomes apparent that a good number of te-
nants who brought Yellowstone actions could have cured the vi-
olation with little cost within the period given to cure and were
at least equal to the landlord in financial or legal power.°10 In
the meantime, the landlord has a tenant using his property for a
use not permitted by the lease. If such a use is in violation of
building, zoning, fire or criminal codes, the landlord, as the
owner of record, is the party who is cited with the violation, and
usually fined.101 Therefore, the landlord pays when the tenant
refuses to cure the violation.
If the Yellowstone doctrine is supposed to save powerless
tenants who unknowingly lose their leases because of minor vio-
lations, it is too costly a cure. Only the wealthy individual or
commercial tenant can afford the costly Yellowstone action.
This is probably why the overwhelming majority of Yellowstone
decisions come out of the First Department, specifically New
York County. 02 The average tenant, when faced with a notice to
cure, fixes the violation or negotiates with the landlord for more
time. 03 Very few small business owners are (or residential te-
nants were) willing to expose themselves to the long and costly
Yellowstone proceedings to decide whether they can keep their
store sign up, or keep their poodles in their apartments, in direct
violation of their leases.
Moreover, the Yellowstone doctrine has become so for-
mulaic as to lead to absurd results. If a tenant fails to throw in a
mea culpa with respect to his "alleged" violation,""4 he might
not get the injunction, even if there is a justiciable issue.' But
200 The cost of bringing an action for a Yellowstone injunction and the high poten-
tial for an appeal by either side, regardless of the lower court's decision, would necessa-
rily mean that the tenant has deep pockets.
1o' See NEW YORK ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 27-113 (1992).
102 Wallach, supra note 40, at 5.
'11 Wallach, supra note 40, at 1.
I" This encompasses boilerplate language to the effect that if the court does indeed
find a violation, the tenant is then willing to cure.
"05 Compare Philex Enterprises, Inc. v. Lazner, 131 A.D.2d 452, 515 N.Y.S.2d 874
(2d Dep't 1987) (tenant was selling items which depicted or replicated male genitalia and
the landlord served notice to cure based on lease provision prohibiting the sale of "ob-
scene" or "pornographic" material; court granted tenant Yellowstone injunction) with
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if the tenant remembers to recite the magic phrase "if there is a
violation I will go to reasonable lengths to cure," he will proba-
bly get the injunction, even if there is no reasonable way for him
to cure without vacating the premises. 06 The tenant's ability to
delay curing what is often a clear violation of the lease provides
the tenant an enormous, undisputable and unfair advantage. 10
The New York Court of Appeals should make it clear that the
test for a Yellowstone injunction, as described in Finley, is inap-
propriate, and that lower courts should adhere to the traditional
burden for injunctive relief.
If Yellowstone is about equity, it should accord with the
traditional standards for equitable relief. If there is a true dis-
pute over a lease, or the tenant needs more time to cure, the
court's sympathy is both appropriate and welcome; Cardozo said
as much in Graf.0 s State courts in New Jersey and Connecticut
follow the traditional standards for equitable relief in lease dis-
putes. 0 19 Otherwise, when a cure is either impossible or more ex-
pensive than litigation, the tenant has no reason to negotiate
with the landlord. When a tenant is clearly violating the lease,
courts should not allow the tenant to avoid responsibility to
Cemco, 135 A.D.2d 461, 522 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1987) (Tenant was operating a
transvestite musical and landlord served notice to cure based on lease provision that
premises be occupied in a "dignified manner"; court denied tenant Yellowstone
injunction.).
100 See, e.g., Times Square Stores Corp. v. Bernice Realty Co., 107 A.D.2d 677, 484
N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dep't 1985); Herzfeld & Stern v. Ironwood Realty Corp., 102 A.D.2d
737, 477 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep't 1984); Demler v. Bing & Bing Mgmt., Inc., 116 Misc. 2d
793, 456 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
102 Post v. 120 E. End Ave. Corp., 62 N.Y.2d at 28, 464 N.E.2d at 125, 475 N.Y.S.2d
at 825 (1984).
'0' See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
100 In summary proceedings involving commercial leases, Connecticut courts use the
standard injunctive relief test to decide whether to grant a stay (Connecticut Mobile
Home Ass'n. Inc. v. Jensen's, Inc., 424 A.2d 285 (Conn. 1979); Seaboard Oil Co. v. Wil-
liamson, 1 Conn. Supp. 47 (1935)). These Connecticut cases are tempered by the same
position that Cardozo took in Graf. Damato v. Gilman, 16 Conn. Supp. 276 (1949).
New Jersey provides that the landlord shall serve a three-day notice of default on a
tenant (including a commercial tenant) committing "any breach or violation of any of
the covenants or agreements in the nature thereof contained in the lease" before starting
an action for removal. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:18-53(c). While a "hardship" stay is available
to residential tenants under N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:42-10.6, any stay to a commercial ten-
ant may be awarded only under the traditional standards for injunctive relief. Spialter v.
Testa, 392 A.2d 1265, aff'd, 408 A.2d 444 (N.J. 1978); Morocco v. Felton, 270 A.2d 739
(N.J. 1970); Galka v. Tide Water Assd. Oil Co., 30 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1943); Red Oaks v.




Another alternative is for the New York State legislature to
preempt all Yellowstone situations by adding a statute to the
RPAPL for commercial tenants in and out of New York City,
similar to RPAPL section 753(4).110 If the stay is mandatory, the
legislature should weigh whether a ten day cure is sufficient time
to cure violations that do not warrant a forfeiture of the lease,
against the burden put on the landlord by having a violation of
the contract. Another approach is to make the stays discretion-
ary, subject to the traditional test for injunctive relief, as in the
case of nonpayment proceedings. Typically, discretionary stays
allow a longer time period to cure than do mandatory stays. The
best way to decide the appropriate time period is to look at the
market. A commercial lease typically has a rider that expands
the cure period to thirty or sixty days. While such a statute will
not satisfy all landlords or all tenants, it is certainly better than
the current inequitable standard embodied in the twisted judi-
cial interpretation of the Yellowstone injunction doctrine.
David Frey
"* Although the New York Court of Appeals clearly limited the Yellowstone doc-
trine to commercial disputes involving lease violations, courts in the First Department
have already begun to erode the court of appeals' Post decision. See Seligmann v. Parcel
One Co., 170 A.D.2d 344, 566 N.Y.S.2d 45 (lst Dep't 1991); Ernestus v. 10 W. 66th St.
Corp., N.Y. L.J., August 26, 1992, at 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1992).
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